

**Grounds for democratic adherence:
Brazil, 2002-2006**

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Introduction

Historical data about the features of democratic adherence and how it works in Latin America suggest that citizens on the subcontinent consistently accept the Churchill's model of democracy.¹ A growing preference for the democratic regime as the best form of government available seems to go side by side with its problems, embodied as much in the distrust of representative institutions as in interpersonal distrust, general lack of interest and reduced engagement in conventional politics. Data suggest that elections are generally regarded in the whole region as a benchmark of political inclusiveness and intervention, and the growing perception of efficiency and fairness of electoral processes adds up as a guarantee of system functioning.

This scenario includes Brazilian democracy, which after 22 years still represents a paradoxical case. The average Brazilian citizen gained access to a wide array of political information sources, got involved with an intense electoral and representative dynamics, mapping his or her own political preferences and engaging in realignments of partisan framework. Nevertheless, surveys carried out along this period have shown that, despite the relative consolidation of participatory mechanisms and procedures, there still persists within Brazilian democratic system a strong depreciation of representative institutions. On a national survey carried out after the 2002 presidential elections, for example, even though more than 75% of the interviewees accepted democracy as the best form of government available, political parties and the National Congress have received a negative evaluation over their performance and have not been ranked among institutions contributing to sustain democracy. These very data have repeatedly emerged in two further surveys in 2006, one year after the moral crisis involving the National Congress in 2005, when several corruption scandals marred the reputation of a good number of deputies. On both surveys there emerged a strong preference for democracy, with shares of respectively 65% of the interviewees for the survey realized in May, and 75,3% for the survey realized in December,

¹ Informe Latinobarómetro 2006, Corporación Latinobarómetro, Santiago de Chile, 2006.


revealing again that the consistent preference for the democratic regime goes hand in hand with a strong distrust of institutions.

Indeed, after two decades of military regime and even though the regime had kept a controlled Congress working and promoted periodical elections as part of its efforts to obtain legitimation, a first conclusion about the New Republic experiment states that this process was not successful in readjusting how citizens regarded representative politics, despite the intense and regular electoral dynamics marking the whole democratization process. This points to a generalized crisis of representativity, closely associated with public institutions' lack of credibility in the country.

Some of the most outstanding data about democratic adherence in Brazil are related to the evolution of preference for the democratic regime. Between the first direct presidential election in 1989 and the last presidential election in 2006, preference for democracy has grown more than 21 percentage points among the Brazilian population (see Graphic 1). Data from surveys carried out during that period show that one of the main positive results of the democratization process has been the increasing awareness of democracy. Between 1989 and 2006, there is a significant decrease in the proportion of people unaware of what democracy means. At the same time, awareness of its meaning tends to be consistently linked to the idea of electoral choice and to solutions provided to social needs (see Table 1).

The very rhetoric of transition mobilized at the time, while privileging direct presidential elections as the central tool for redeeming democracy in the country, has in fact pushed away representative structures as secondary mechanisms. Besides that, democratization has taken place in an environment of deep social and economic crisis in the country and in the region, and references to the solution of economic and social problems have become crucial within the map of adherence to the new regime. Data collected during the period show that the prevailing references to the idea of democracy encompass democratic rights in general, including social, civil and political rights, but without any direct association to the realm of institutions (see Table 1 and Graphics 2 and 3). At the same time, adherence to the democratic system seems to have been considerably strengthened ever since (see Graphic 1).

Graphic 1. Preference for democracy or dictatorship - Brazil, 1989-2006 (%)




Sources: Survey Cultura Política 1989, 1990 and 1993; ESEB2002 (CESOP/Unicamp) and Survey FAPESP/USP/CESOP-Unicamp - J. A. Moisés and R. Meneguello, 2006.

Table 1. Contents predominantly associated with the idea of democracy, Brazil

1989	1993	2006
38,6% were unable to define democracy	34% were unable to define democracy	25,5% were unable to define democracy
40% associated it with rights and freedoms	15% associated it with political rights and regime operativeness	16% associated it with voting and choosing rulers
5,5% associated it with equality and equal opportunities	29,4% associated it with freedom of expression and civil rights	17% associated it with freedom of expression and opinion
4% associated it with the idea of government by the people, elected by the people	4% associated it with social equality	4,5% associated it with freedom of movement and equality

Sources: Survey Cultura Política 1989 and 1993 and Survey FAPESP/USP/CESOP-Unicamp - J. A. Moisés and R. Meneguello, 2006.


Graphic 2. Meanings of democracy, 1988



Source: IDESP, 1988

Question: What is the most important indicator for a country to be considered democratic?

Graphic 3. Meanings of democracy, 2006



Source: Survey "Citizen distrust of democratic institutions - FAPESP - J. A. Moisés and R. Meneguello, USP-Unicamp, 2006.

Question: Do you think democracy has to do with... (sum of answers "has to do" and "has to do a lot").

In a study based on results provided by a survey carried out in 2002 in Brazil (Meneguello, 2006a)², it was possible to verify significant adherence to the democratic regime, characterized by mediating issues of democratic legitimation and accompanied by a clear appreciation of the value accorded to elections as a tool for intervention in the political domain. Even though it is commonly expected that, according to assumptions based on representative democratic theory, elections are associated with good democratic performance, it seems important to stress that electoral participation constitutes a central element for the civic engagement of citizens. The increased value assigned to political parties emerged less clearly in that study and, indeed, it seemed to depict the fragile relationship Brazilian citizens maintain with representative organizations (Kinzo, 2005; Lamounier, 1980, 1983, 1986; Moisés, 1992). In that study we have also found an intriguing dissociation between satisfaction with democracy and aggregated issues of institutional evaluation, suggesting that, within the citizens' map of values, good democratic performance is completely independent from the performance of private and public institutions – including representative institutions. Moreover, the dimensions of public services evaluation and the dimensions of government and institutional performance evaluation proved to be dissociated from each other, suggesting that, for the average citizen, the “making” of daily life, the performance of the government, of the democratic system and of the institutions were not related to each other.

General issues emerging from that study have been thoroughly analyzed on both surveys carried out in 2006, dealing with the mainstays of democratic adherence. We have therein sought to identify aspects associated with adherence to the democratic regime as well as with evaluation of regime performance. Data show that, in fact, for the citizens concerned, these emerge as independent dimensions. In what regards adherence, preference for democracy reemerges in association with voting; in what regards satisfaction with the regime, the “weight” of data comes forward in aspects associated with the performance of the current government, evaluation of the economic situation and public management issues. We have introduced an additional component, in order to build a scenario of possible adherence stances, defined by memory of previous governments, including the last decade of the military regime (1974-1984). It has thus become clear that the framework of political references for the average citizen is composed by ongoing references, predominantly associated with the government and its performance.

² ESEB - Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro (Brazilian Electoral Survey), 2002. CESOP/Unicamp and DataUFF/UFF.

The two surveys are somewhat different in what refers to the questions used in each of them – the survey “Citizen distrust of democratic institutions”³, carried out in June 2006, has been devised in order to assess institutional trust and associated issues; the survey ESEB2006⁴, carried out after the presidential elections in December 2006, has been devised in order to deal with electoral and partisan behavior; nevertheless, particularly in terms of democratic adherence and issues associated with performance evaluation, both questionnaires are virtually identical. Questions about political memory have been used exclusively in the survey “Citizen distrust of democratic institutions”.

In order to go deeper into each of the samplings, Graphics 1 and 2 highlight some of the opinions of the interviewees about democracy, political representation and government evaluation. Broadly speaking, both surveys reveal citizens with a significant adherence to democratic values and similarly high levels of support to democracy and to voting as a tool for political action. At the same time, they criticize democratic performance in the country in general, as well as particularly in what refers to political parties and the National Congress. With slight variations, data of both surveys depict what Dahl (2000) has underlined as “evidences of the paradox” observed in many of the most stable democratic countries, in which low levels of satisfaction with democratic performance go hand in hand with high levels of support and preference for democracy. In democratizing countries, this “paradox” can also be observed, but in these cases, grounds for political support and legitimacy are crucial for stabilization (Klingemann, 1999; Mishler & Rose, 2001).

In the *Citizen distrust* survey, thus, satisfaction with democratic performance ranks around 20,7%, while in the ESEB survey it reaches a more than twice higher mark, 42,6%. This difference is also observed in the evaluation of the Lula government: while in the *Citizen distrust* survey the positive evaluation ranks around 49,3%, it reaches in the ESEB survey a 26-point higher mark, ranking around 75,4%. The different conjunctures in which each of the surveys was carried out, with a 6-month interval, must also be taken into account as they seem to indicate that the post-electoral conjuncture (harboring the ESEB2006 survey


³ The survey “Citizen distrust of democratic institutions” is part of a Thematic Project funded by FAPESP (Sao Paulo State Research Foundation), coordinated by José Álvaro Moisés (NUPPES/University of São Paulo) and Rachel Meneguello (CESOP/University of Campinas). It has been carried out between May and June 2006, with a national sample of 2,004 interviews.

⁴ ESEB2006 is a national survey with academic design, developed by CESOP (Center for Public Opinion Research) following guidelines of the project CSES-Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Univ. of Michigan). It has been carried out after the 2006 elections, between December 17 and December 27, by IPSOS-Opinion Brasil. Its national sample encompasses 1,000 interviews. It has been the second ESEB cycle; the first one had taken place during and after the 2002 general elections.

during an election that eventually reelected President Lula with more than 61% of the valid votes) exerts some influence over general stances and help to explain a significantly better evaluation of the government and of democracy in the country. These data serve also to introduce our hypothesis that the grounds for adherence to democracy and for the evaluation of democratic regime performance produce distinct and independent dimensions, resulting from distinct perceptions of specific situations.

In the first part of this essay, we analyze the grounds for adherence to democracy on both surveys; in the second part, we introduce variables linked to recollection of previous regimes in what regards some performance aspects, based on the hypothesis that regime evaluation results also from its comparative dimension; in the third part, we analyze the grounds for satisfaction with democracy and with its performance.

Graphic 4. Opinions about democracy, representation and government (%)
Citizen distrust of democratic institutions and ESEB(June 2006- Dec 2006)



Sources: Survey Citizen distrust of democratic institutions, June 2006; Survey ESEB2006, Dec 2006.

1. Grounds for adherence

We have followed the conceptual distinctions drawn by Gunther and Montero (2003) between the idea of legitimacy or support to democracy and the idea of satisfaction with the democratic regime, and we have accordingly considered that democratic legitimacy must be regarded as an ideal type related to citizens' beliefs that democratic politics and the institutions upon which it is established are the most adequate way to organize the political system. Such notion is also based upon the "Churchillian hypothesis" (democracy as a lesser evil if compared to non-democratic regime) as assumed in approaches such as Rose's, called a "contingent" approach", seeking to allow for a comparison between political situations experienced in two distinct moments (Rose, 2001[1997]). This notion of concurrence between regimes seems to fit the Brazilian case, due to its relatively recent democratic experience and to the presence of a broad adult electoral constituency on both authoritarian and democratic periods.

Besides the questions related to preference or adherence to specific regimes, the adherence construct is composed by institutional anchors upon which the idea of democracy within the surveyed group's map of values is based. It is delimited by dimensions such as political representation, either through political parties, the parliament or elections. A number of studies on political culture in Brazil point out the crucial role played by elections and electoral participation in contributing for notions of democracy during the post-85 period (Moises, 1992 and 1995; Muscinsky & Mendes, 1990; Lavareda, 1989). These works indicate that the idea of democratization at the end of the dictatorial period started in 1964 and beginning of the democratic period in 1985 has always been significantly associated with the realization of direct presidential elections. Indeed, the dynamics of electoral participation has concentrated a good share of actions related to what could be called civic engagement during the democratic transition.

In order to assess such issues in 2006, adherence has been considered above all from the point of view of its associations with the representative system. The Brazilian democratization process is strongly linked to elections and choice procedures; and despite the fact that the National Congress and political parties have been kept uninterruptedly

working -- even during the authoritarian period, although to a limited extent --, citizens' bonds with representative institutions have always proved to be rather loose. We have thus sought to investigate the nature and resilience of those bonds after 21 years of democracy.

Democratic adherence has been assessed by two main surveys, ESEB2006 and *Citizen distrust*, and the results concerning issues underlying citizens' evaluation of democratic rule tend to overlap in what regards the grounds upon which citizens base their relationship to the democratic regime. Initially we have sought to understand Brazilians' adherence to democracy as ruling system and to some of the values associated with it by means of 7 questions, extracted from the ESEB2006, resorting to accepted referentials of participation within the system: government composition through elections and efficacy of citizens' votes, relationship between governments and political parties, as well as the sheer preference for democratic rule as opposed to dictatorship.

1) *Some people say that it makes an enormous difference who rules the country. Others say that it doesn't make any difference at all. We would like you to give a **grade from 1 to 5**. 1 means that it makes a great difference who rules the country and 5 means that it does NOT make any difference at all. What do you think?*

2) *Some people say that our vote has a great degree of influence on what happens in Brazil, while others say that it does NOT influence at all what happens in Brazil. We would like you to give a **grade from 1 to 5**. 1 means that our vote has a great degree of influence and 5 means it does NOT influence at all what happens in Brazil. What do you think?*

3) *In your opinion...*

- 1 Democracy is always better than any other form of government OR
- 2 In some cases, dictatorship is better than democracy
- 3 It doesn't matter / Neither is better

4) *Now, changing the subject: Democracy has some problems, but it is better than any other form of government. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? How much or little? (Stimulated and single – multiple options offered and respondent accepts only one) (Instructions: to be asked in two steps; the answer “neither agree nor disagree” is to be accepted as spontaneous answer)*

- 1 I very much agree
- 2 I agree a little
- 3 I neither agree nor disagree
- 4 I disagree a little
- 5 I very much disagree

5) *If voting weren't mandatory, would you still vote?*

- 1 – Yes 0 – No 55 – Maybe/It depends

6) *Which is better: a President who...*

- 1 is identified with a political party OR
- 2 doesn't give importance to political parties?

7) *In your opinion, presidential elections...*

- 1 help a lot
- 2 help a little
- 3 don't help to make peoples' lives any better.

The phenomenon of democratic adherence has proved to be indeed multidimensional. The analysis presented on Table 2 depicts a space constituted by **three components**. The first one, with a variance explained of 32,8%, shall be called importance of voting. Therein is encompassed the central role of voting within the political system, specially in the composition of governments. The second component, largely independent of the first one, is the democratic adherence component itself, in which both questions about preference for democracy are merged; the third component, also independent and less loaded than components related to the other dimensions, aggregates two questions regarding electoral dynamics in terms of participation and importance. Within this dimension, there is still the question deemed to evaluate opinions about the President's identification with political parties, and its occurrence, associated with electoral dynamics, suggests a minor significance for the partisan component. With an equally strong explicative power, reaching 65.5%, this model reveals a strong association of the democratic idea with electoral dynamics and the incidence of independent components, isolating the preference for the democratic regime from choice-related references.

Table 2 - Democratic adherence - ESEB, 2006

	Component		
	1	2	3
It does matter who rules the country	,897		
Voting may influence what happens in the country	,887		
Preference for democratic rule or, given the case, dictatorship		,812	
Democracy is better than any other political system		,807	
Would still vote, even if voting weren't mandatory			,675
President identified or not with political party			,683
Presidential elections help or not to improve living standards in the country			,648

Source: ESEB2006

Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1,708	24,394	24,394
2	1,507	21,523	45,917
3	1,370	19,577	65,495

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

The second step has involved an analysis of democratic adherence based upon the survey “Citizen distrust of democratic institutions”, whose main goal was identifying the bases for the phenomenon of distrust of democratic institutions. Once again, we have favoured an analysis of specific nodes of the representative system and their association with regime preferences. The questions used were the following:

1. Please listen to the following statement: Democracy may have problems, but it is the best form of government. Do you agree or disagree?
2. I would like you to tell me with which of the following statements do you agree most:
 - a) Democracy is always better than any other form of government.
 - b) Given the circumstances, a dictatorship might be better than a democratic regime.
 - c) It doesn't matter whether the government is democratic or dictatorial.
3. Some people believe that without political parties there can be no democracy, while others believe that democracy can work without political parties. What do you think?
 - a) There can be no democracy without political parties OR
 - b) Democracy can work without political parties.
4. Which one is better:
 - a) A President identified with a political party OR
 - b) A President who disregards all political parties?
5. In your opinion, political parties are: (read out options 1 and 2)
 - a) Indispensable to democracy
 - b) Serve only to divide people
 - c) Other answers.
6. The National Congress is composed by Federal Deputies and Senator elected by the people. Some people believe that there can be no democracy without the National Congress, while others believe that democracy can work in Brazil without the National Congress. What do you think?
 - a) There can be no democracy without the National Congress OR
 - b) Democracy can work without the National Congress.
7. Do you think that Brazil needs the National Congress, that is, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, or could we get along without it?
 - a) The country need the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate OR
 - b) We could get along without the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
8. If voting weren't mandatory, would you still vote in the next Presidential elections?
Yes
No
9. Do you believe that:
 - 1 The way people vote may change things for the better OR
 - 2 It doesn't matter how people vote, nothing will change?

Data reveal an interesting 2-component solution, with explaining power of $\alpha=54.3\%$, wherein the first component encompasses all questions associated with the role played by political parties and the National Congress, both for the country and for democracy in general, all of them with high loading, higher than 0.7. Although with lower loadings, questions associated with political parties also emerge in Component 1, specifying however the need for the President to be identified with political parties and the role political parties play in the political life. It is the second component that, in its turn, composes an interesting dimension, in which the preference for democracy (measured through two questions) emerges associated to voting, as much in its role as a tool for intervening into the system as in terms of adherence to the idea of free choice, embodied in the intention of voting voluntarily. These data reinforce the importance of voting and elections, already stressed within the adherence matrix of the ESEB2006 survey.

Table 3. Democratic adherence – Project: Citizen distrust of democratic institutions

	Fatores	
	1	2
degree of agreement with democracy as the best form of government		,666
opinion on democracy or dictatorship as the best form of government		,616
political parties are necessary for democracy	,789	
National Congress is necessary for democracy	,786	
opinion on whether parties are indispensable or a divisive factor	,479	
opinion on whether the President must be identified with political parties or not	,517	
voting is important in order to change things		,638
National Congress is necessary for Brazil	,701	
would still vote, even if voting weren't mandatory		,616

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2,280	25,334	25,334
2	1,805	20,053	45,387

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

This separation of variables into two supposedly associated components is what intrigues us most. **In what measure references of democracy sustentation among Brazilian citizens result from dissociated perceptions and notions, separating representative institutions from the value assigned to voting and from democracy support?** We have thus searched into associations between all variables in order to identify possible relations. As it can be seen on Table 3a, democracy support – for both sets of questions – reveals very reduced associations with support to political parties and to the National Congress, as much in normative terms as for the specific situation in Brazil. In the case of the value assigned to voting, adherence to mandatory voting and to voting as a tool for change have particularly reduced associations with general partisan support and support to the Congress.

These data point to a real “independence” between components. Even if we observe intra-component associations, we can find significant associations, but only on a medium level. In the case of Component 2, encompassing regime support and value assigned to voting, the strongest association occurs between both options of support to the democratic regime, and it does not even reach 0.3 (0.282). In the case of Component 1, where representative institutional references are present, values change, and associations between Congress support and partisan support reach respectively 0.493 for normative support to political parties and to the Congress, 0.381 for the necessity of the Congress for democracy and for the country, and 0.325 for the relation between the necessity of the Congress for the country and of political parties for democracy. Despite the observed convergence, what stands out however in terms of relations between components are the weak associations with variables of democratic adherence.

Table 3a. Contingency coefficients and associated components

	Congress is necessary for democracy	President identified with a political party	Congress is necessary for Brazil	Political parties are indispensable	Democracy as the best form of government (Churchill)	Preference for democracy or dictatorship	Importance of voting for change	Mandatory vote	Factor 1	Factor 2
Political parties are necessary for democracy	0,493	0,258	0,325	0,271	0,135	0,160	0,135	0,095	,789	,016
Congress is necessary for democracy		0,216	0,381	0,230	0,163	0,171	0,136	0,094	,786	,036
President identified with political party			0,297	0,288	0,105	0,111	0,197	0,101	,517	,187
Congress is necessary for Brazil				0,302	0,199	0,174	0,184	0,213	,701	,150
Political parties are indispensable					0,174	0,193	0,218	0,231	,479	,369
Democracy as the best form of government (Churchill)									,121	,666
Preference for democracy or dictatorship					0,282				,132	,616
Importance of voting for change					0,255	0,219			,134	,638
Mandatory vote					0,209	0,178	0,213		,033	,616

Source: Project: Citizen distrust of democratic institutions

2. The influence of political memory over adherence

The analysis of the grounds for democratic adherence has demanded an exploration of the impact of memory variables regarding previous governments together with the evaluation of the current government. The idea behind this hypothesis is that the Brazilian democratization process is marked by some “politicizing events” (Rose, 1999), responsible for the creation of contents related to support to the government and to the system. The first of these events is related to the representative system itself and to the appreciation of direct voting procedures. The course of the Brazilian transition processes had already been set within the electoral realm during the military regime, based on a foundational discourse concerning the democratic regime in which direct presidential elections would represent the benchmark for the construction of the new regime. The period after 1985 has seen the extension of voting rights and of the number of political parties, as well as an intense frequency of elections, intercalating every two years elections for the executive and for the legislative on different levels of the federative structure. Within this process, the presidential election has marked the moments of most intense popular mobilization.

The second politicizing event can be found at the intersection between economy and politics, and it has been produced by means of economic plans adopted throughout the democratization period, establishing patterns of identification with the government and parameters for its evaluation. Indeed, economic references such as inflation control and improvement of income and employment rates have played a central role in raising expectations and hopes for further democratization in many Latin American countries in the beginning of the 80s. During the transition period, it was necessary to overcome a scenario marked above all by a generalized depression, depreciation of all indicators of economic growth and the social deficit inherited from previous authoritarian regimes. Thus the main ground for political preferences and choices was found in a common horizon aggregating the evaluation of economic policies and the perspective of monetary stabilization.

Studies devoted to understand democratization processes in Latin America show that experiences of economic recovery in those emerging scenarios had a significant impact on the formation of citizens' preferences, indicating that, besides political processes, socio-

economic processes were crucial to establish the grounds for the new regime's legitimation and operativeness (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Remmer, 1993; Meneguello, 1995; 2006b; Echegaray, 1995; 2005). The Brazilian case embodies quite well this process. Several studies have confirmed that already at the outset of the democratic regime the grounds for the constituted and expected conception of democracy could be found among the references of pursuit of welfare and minimal living standards. With the implementation of the economic stabilization plan in July 1994 – the Real Plan – many favorable changes on levels of economic activity in Brazil, as well as on income rates, have marked positively the transformation of the social framework in the country, with the reversion of patterns of social exclusion and a substantive growth of per capita income rates.

It is undeniable that the Brazilian development model has produced economic growth attached to one of the most unequal patterns of income distribution in the world. However, this period is also marked by an increase in the consumption of basic products by the poorest social groups, widening considerably consumption markets and integrating traditionally marginalized sectors (Hoffman, 2001). That was a central component of the political capital assembled by the Presidency during that period. It helped to establish new record rates of government support and approval and, despite its eventual limitations, the 5 years of monetary stability promoted a definitive break with the long tradition of uncontrolled inflation rates in the country. The 4 years of the first Cardoso government provided an experience of monetary stability completely unknown to several generations of Brazilian. Even without adopting a coherent development policy, able to establish and sustain the bases of that stability, the government has managed to produce a high level of popularity for the President, based on the prospective evaluation of general improvements in the country, with the end of inflation and the growth of average buying power. Such expectations of future performance have eventually led to the reelection of Cardoso in 1998. This symbiotic relation between tendencies in the evaluation of presidential performance and in the evaluation of economic performance has marked the perceptions of the general population about the government throughout the period between 1995 and 2006 (Meneguello, 2006b).

Questions used:

1) *In your opinion, President Lula is performing:*

- 1 *Very well*
- 2 *Well*
- 3 *Not so well*
- 4 *Poorly*
- 5 *Very poorly*

2) *About the economic situation during the Lula government, since January 2003, would you say it has improved, worsened or remained the same as it was before?*

- 1 *Improved*
- 2 *Remained the same*
- 3 *Worsened*

3) *About the economic situation during the FHC government, between January 1994 and December 2002, would you say that it had improved, worsened or remained the same as it was before?*

4) *In comparison with the last 10 years of the military regime, during the General Geisel and General Figueiredo governments, would you say that the present economic situation has improved, worsened or remained the same as it was during that period?*

5) *In what refers to human rights, during the FHC government, do you consider that the situation then had improved, worsened or remained the same as it was during the previous period?*

6) *And during the Lula government, would you say that the human rights situation has improved, worsened or remained the same as it was before?*

7) *In comparison with the last 10 years of the military regime, during the General Geisel and General Figueiredo governments, would you say that the human rights situation has improved, worsened or remained the same as it was during that period?*

8) *In terms of corruption and influence peddling, would you say that during the FHC government things improved, worsened or remained the same as they were before?*

9) *And during the Lula government, would you say that, in terms of corruption and influence peddling, things improved, worsened or remained the same as they were before?*

10) *In comparison with the last 10 years of the military regime, during the General Geisel and General Figueiredo governments, would you say that, in terms of corruption and influence peddling, things today have improved, worsened or remained the same as they were during that period?*

11) *Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Democracy may have problems, but it is still the best system of government?*

12) *I would like you to tell me which of the following statements do you agree most with:*

- a) *Democracy is always better than any other form of government.*
- b) *In some circumstances, a dictatorship might be better than a democratic regime.*
- c) *It doesn't matter whether the government is democratic or dictatorial.*

13) *Some people believe that, without political parties, there can be no democracy, while others believe democracy can work without political parties. What do you think?*

- a) *There can be no democracy without political parties OR*
- b) *Democracy can work without political parties*

14) Which of the following is better?

- a) A President who is identified with a political party OR
- b) A President who doesn't give importance to political parties

15) In your opinion, political parties: (read out options 1 and 2)

- a) Are indispensable to democracy
- b) Serve only to divide the people
- c) Other answers

16) The National Congress is composed by Federal Deputies and Senators elected by the people. Some people believe there can be no democracy without the National Congress, while others believe democracy can work in Brazil without the National Congress. What is your opinion?

- a) There can be no democracy without the National Congress
- b) Democracy can work without the National Congress

17) Do you believe Brazil needs the National Congress, that is, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, or could we get along well without it?

- a) The country needs the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
- b) We could get along well without the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate

18) If voting weren't mandatory, would you still vote in the next Presidential elections?

- Yes
- No

19) Which of the following statements do you agree with?

- 1 Depending on how people vote, things can improve
- 2 It doesn't matter how people vote, it won't improve things

When political memory variables are introduced, including memory of the current government's performance (Lula government, 2003-2006), as well as of the previous government (FHC government, 1994-2002) and of the military governments (1975-1985), regarding economic, corruption and human rights aspects, data move in such a way as to reveal how strong does the evaluation of the present regime and the perceptions of economic performance influence regime adherence.

Our model's solution generated 5 components with variance explained of $\alpha=56,6\%$. Component 1 is the Lula government component. Therein can be found the government and economic performance evaluation variables with the highest loadings within the matrix (higher than 0.8), notwithstanding the evaluation of the current government's human rights record (0,741) and of corruption levels, with a lower loading (0,594).

Component 2 could be called the memory component properly said, since it is composed exclusively by the evaluation of the economic situation and of the human rights' record of the previous governments, the FHC and the military governments stretching from 1975 until 1985. What is substantively and subjectively included in the disposition of components 1 and 2 is the role played by the Real Economic Plan as a reference for the evaluation of the economic situation of previous political periods. Nevertheless, it doesn't seem to be casual that the evaluation of the economic situation during the Lula government finds its place in a different component in contrast to the evaluation of the economic situation of previous governments. Component 1 (above) depicts, in various aspects, the precedence of the evaluation of the economic situation of the current government over all other political-temporal references. This model, as well as the previously analyzed models, show that questions associated with the Lula government oscillate together, almost completely isolated from other components.

Component 3 can be called representative institutions component, since it contains not only questions stressing that political parties and the National Congress are necessary so that democracy can work, as well as that the National Congress is necessary for the country. It is only with Component 4, called democracy component that questions about the preference for and evaluation of democracy in the country emerge, in association with the two questions asserting the importance of voting. These data repeat the previously stated association between democracy and elections, but within this model such a relationship has a particular incidence, since this notion of democracy doesn't oscillate when perceptions about the economic situation in the country during the Lula, FHC and military governments are properly put together, neither do the perceptions about human rights' records and corruption levels for these various periods.

Finally, Component 5, regarding corruption evaluation, aggregates all evaluative questions referring to all political periods, including the Lula government, by means of a question that emerges within this component with loading 0.601 and within Component 1, with loading 0,594.

This last analytical model of democratic adherence indicates that the immediate political framework represents the prime reference citizens have in order to situate

themselves in relation to the democratic system. In this case, it is the weight of the current government and its performance in terms of economy and human rights that determine the shape of the political memory we have been looking for. Regime preference is not directly associated with both these dimensions, being rather more closely related, as it has already been said before, to the importance attributed to the vote. Although it emerges from a less loaded dimension, it is important to reaffirm the isolated weight of elections within the composition of regime preference. In a certain way, such independent dimensions as representative institutions and democracy suggest that the institutional performance of political parties and of the Congress do not have an effect on the preference for democracy. Moreover, the independent character of corruption perceptions throughout all periods taken into account tends to isolate the idea of democracy from notions of transparency and influence peddling. This may help us to understand the scenario of the 2005 political crisis, and why corruption scandals weren't sufficient to jar evaluations of the government, of the President, neither preference for democracy.

Table 4. Memory and satisfaction
Rotated Component Matrix(a)

	Component				
	1	2	3	4	5
Evaluation of the Lula government	,838				
Evaluation of the economic situation during the first Lula government	,843				
Evaluation of the present economic situation in comparison with the FHC government (1994-2002)		,693			
Evaluation of the present economic situation in comparison with the military governments		,637			
Evaluation of the human rights record of the FHC government in comparison with the previous period		,740			
Evaluation of the human rights record of the Lula government in comparison with the previous period	,741				
Evaluation of the human rights record of the Lula government in comparison with the military period		,643			
Evaluation of the corruption levels of the FHC government in comparison with the previous period					,636
Evaluation of the corruption levels of the Lula government in comparison with the previous period	,594				,601
Evaluation of the present corruption levels in comparison with the military period					,673
Level of preference for democracy				,618	
Preference for democracy or dictatorship				,601	
Parties necessary in a democratic regime			,806		
Parliament necessary in a democratic regime			,811		
Importance of voting in order to improve the situation				,669	
National Congress necessary for Brazil			,676		
Would still vote if voting were not mandatory				,600	

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2,693	14,172	14,172
2	2,250	11,844	26,015
3	2,217	11,669	37,685
4	1,945	10,235	47,920
5	1,655	8,708	56,628

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

3. Grounds for satisfaction and performance

Based on the conceptual distinction made by Gunther and Montero (2003) between the idea of democratic support and the idea of satisfaction with the regime, we have composed a dimension dealing specifically with regime performance, observed through levels of satisfaction with democracy as practiced in the country and some other related issues, such as a diffuse evaluation of the government and the evaluation of public services.

Satisfaction with democracy as practiced in the country goes hand in hand with the evaluation of system outcomes (Easton, 1975). Three sets of questions have been assembled in order to measure citizens' criticism of the state of affairs in the country. The first one regards satisfaction with democracy in the country and with related aspects, as potential indicators of democratic performance evaluation defining through an evaluative dimension: evaluation of the government, of individual freedom and human rights, and of corruption levels. The second one is based on the hypothesis that regime performance evaluation is associated with government performance and, more specifically, with public services, since they represent the most direct daily relationship between citizens and the state, and might accordingly have an impact on levels of trust of politicians and the government, although indirectly (Listhaug, 1998). Within the same dimension of impact on trust levels the third set of questions can be found (in fact, a single question with multiple item evaluation), evaluating the performance of public and private institutions. It has been widely used in international surveys in order to assess democratic support on a medium range scale.

Departing from the assumption that democratic support and satisfaction with the regime are distinct dimensions, we have, accordingly, sought to identify associated components among those used to evaluate the government itself and the state's management as perceived by citizens (public services), as well as the perceived institutional performance, with special attention for the representative system, one's own satisfaction with the regime, based on the evaluation of democracy in the country. The performance of the democratic regime has been measured by means of 4 questions, 2 of them regarding respectively evaluation of the government and of the regime and 2 of them composing batteries of respectively institutional evaluation and evaluation of public services.

- 1) In general, do you consider yourself very satisfied, satisfied, not so satisfied, or unsatisfied with how democracy works in Brazil?
- 1 Very satisfied
 - 2 Satisfied
 - 3 Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied
 - 4 Not so satisfied
 - 5 Unsatisfied
- 2) In your opinion, the Lula government in the last 4 years has been altogether...
- | | |
|---------------|--------------|
| 1 - VERY GOOD | 2 - GOOD |
| 3 - BAD | 4 - VERY BAD |
- 3) I am going to present you a list of several institutions and I would like you to say for each of them if you consider its performance very good, good, bad or very.
- a) Catholic Church
 - b) Police
 - c) Federal Government
 - d) Judicial System
 - e) Big companies
 - f) Political parties
 - g) National Congress
 - h) Military
 - i) Globo Broadcasting Network
 - j) Other broadcasting networks
- 4) I am going to present you a list of public services and I would like you to give a grade from 0 to 10 representing how satisfied you are with each one of them.
- a) Trash collection
 - b) Police
 - c) Cleaning of streets and sidewalks
 - d) Maintenance of streets and sidewalks
 - e) Control of street vendors, pub tables and shops' dispensers set out on sidewalks
 - f) Sport courts, squares and leisure areas
 - g) Public schools
 - h) Public health care
 - i) Public illumination
 - j) Water supply
 - k) Sewage system

The matrix on Table 5 depicts a 4-component solution. With significant loadings around 0.7 and higher, **the first component is entirely formed by variables revealing “satisfaction/insatisfaction with public services”**, and includes all possible answers mentioned in the questionnaire. **The second component, in its turn, is entirely formed by items deemed to evaluated institutions' performances**, not including however all possible answers mentioned. Catholic Church, the military, the police, big companies and TV broadcasting networks don't take part in it, and only the 2 variables deemed to evaluate TV

networks eventually emerge isolated in another component. It seems important to stress that the evaluation of the state's actions through public services does not occupy the same dimension of evaluations of institutions in general, and public institutions specifically. On the one hand, this dissociation might partially explain the detachment and misunderstanding towards the political structure for solving problems and attending requests; it might as well be expression of sheer institutional distrust.

The **third component** is composed by 2 variables represented in the second component, namely those deemed to evaluate TV networks, Globo Network and others. The composition of this component allows to suggest only how independent citizens' views are in regard of their wider institutional evaluation. The **fourth component**, in its turn, encompasses accordingly variables of satisfaction with the performance of the system and of the government. Their combination into a component with high loadings indicates the importance of general perceptions of the government for the emergence of satisfaction with democracy. This model has $\alpha=58.5\%$ of its variance explained.

**Table 3 - Regime performance -
ESEB,2006**

Rotated Component Matrix

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
evaluation of the first Lula government				,787
satisfaction with democracy's performance in the country				,746
evaluation of the federal government		,632		
evaluation of the judiciary		,683		
evaluation of the political parties		,800		
evaluation of the National Congress		,776		
evaluation of Globo Broadcasting Network			,852	
evaluation of other broadcasting networks			,835	
evaluation of public services - trash collection	,668			
evaluation of public services - police	,702			
evaluation of public services - cleaning of streets and sidewalks	,810			
evaluation of public services - maintenance of streets and sidewalks	,814			
evaluation of public services - control of street vendors, pub tables and shops' dispensers set out on sidewalks	,752			
evaluation of public services - sport courts, squares and leisure areas	,806			
evaluation of public services - public schools	,737			
evaluation of public services - public health care	,695			
evaluation of public services - public illumination	,829			
evaluation of public services - water supply	,786			
evaluation of public services - sewage system	,789			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

Source: ESEB2006

Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	6,613	28,751	28,751
2	3,026	13,156	41,907
3	2,313	10,055	51,962
4	1,511	6,570	58,532

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

A bivariate analysis on the relationship between evaluation of the Lula government and satisfaction with democracy's performance reasserts that evaluation of the government plays a role in perceptions about system's performance: data show that, among the 42.6% of the interviewees who declare themselves satisfied with democracy's performance in Brazil (satisfied and very satisfied), 89.4% evaluate positively the Lula government, against 10% who evaluate it negatively. Those who evaluate positively the Lula government (good and very good) are 75.7% of the interviewees and, among these, 50% evaluate democracy positively. For those who evaluate negatively democracy's performance (41% of the interviewees), 62.5% evaluate positively the Lula government, against 36% who evaluate it negatively.

Despite the fact that this component indicates a strong association between perceptions of government performance and democratic regime performance, it is remarkable the independence between all the other component within the matrix, displaying in distinct instances evaluation of institutions, evaluation of public services and management, and evaluation of the government and regime. Therefore, this suggests that, for the interviewees, democracy's performance and the resulting adherence to it cut across instances of wide and general perception on the state of affairs in the country.

Moving on to identify in this second survey the sustaining variables of the idea of performance, the distribution pattern we came across for the variables among 6 components and their loadings repeat the previously observed pattern of their importance. This model is based on the idea that perceptions of regime performance are rather associated with the evaluation of objective dimensions of public management and economy and with the perception of institutional references than with the evaluation of democratic performance itself. The questions used were the following:

- 1) *Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, not so satisfied or unsatisfied with how democracy works in Brazil?*
- 2) *How do you see democracy in Brazil? Is Brazil a full democracy, a democracy with minor problems, a democracy with major problems, or do you*

9) *And what about the next 12 months, how do you believe your and your family's economic situation will be in comparison to the economic situation you are in now?*

- 1 *Much better*
- 2 *A little better*
- 3 *It will remain the same*
- 4 *A little worse*
- 5 *Much worse*

10) *Comparing your economic situation today with 10 ten years ago, would you say that, in comparison with the rest of Brazilians, it has:*

- 1 *Improved a lot*
- 2 *Improved a little*
- 3 *Remained the same*
- 4 *Worsened a little*
- 5 *Worsened a lot*

11) *Do you consider your earnings and your family's total income to be enough to satisfy your basic needs? Please indicate under which of the following situations do you find yourself in?*

- 1 *It is enough, I can build up savings*
- 2 *It is enough, I don't experience any major difficulties*
- 3 *It is not enough, I experience some difficulties*
- 4 *It is not enough, I experience some major difficulties*

12) *How do you evaluate the public services in the country? What do you think about the following?*

Housing
Health care
Transportation
Police
Education
Unemployment insurance
Sewage and sanitation
Social welfare

13) *I would like you to evaluate the performance of each of the following institutions:*

Church
Armed forces
Judicial system
Police
National Congress
Political parties
Television
Trade unions
Businessmen
Government
President
Firefighters
Laws of the country

We have found a 6-component solution, showing that performance evaluation in the democratic system depends above all on the evaluation of institutions that set up the foundations of the regime – which exclusively composes Component 1 – and on the evaluation of public services – which exclusively composes Component 2. This scenario indicates that for the citizens system management capacity is evaluated in terms of public management of daily affairs and institutional references related to government conduct and representation of interests.

Within this set of institutions, the “armed forces” are absent from Component 1, occurring only on Component 4, indicating that there is a significant dissociation of this reference from system management, while pointing to an important effect of 21 years of democratic rule. On the other hand, evaluation of the “firefighters” occurs within this very component. From the whole list of evaluated institutions, three of them do not occur on any component within the matrix, namely “Catholic Church”, “TV networks” and “laws of the country”.

On Component 3 the variables with the highest loadings in the whole matrix (more than 0.8) are assembled. They deal with the evaluation of the President and of the economic situation in the country, as much in a retrospective as in a prospective sense, reasserting the importance of the economic dimension for perceptions of political performance. The personal economic dimension emerges in two questions, but only on Component 5, and it is only on Component 6 that questions measuring satisfaction with democracy and evaluation of its performance in the country emerge, together with perceptions about fairness of electoral procedures. This is a significant value, since the model shows that its total explaining capacity of $\alpha = 53.5\%$ is concentrated above all on the first three components ($\alpha = 36.8\%$), revealing a construct where system management is marked by the aggregation of aspects regarding the evaluation of institutional performance and of public services, as well as the close association between evaluation of the economic situation and of the President.

In a more isolated variant in this model, the perception of democracy in the country in its turn is rooted in a more specific ground, whose outer limits are marked by satisfaction with and evaluation of the ruling regime in the country, as well as by the association with perceptions about electoral procedures, in special by the evaluation of their efficacy (fair/fraudulent elections). This is in fact an internally “independent” construct, as observed in the associations between both processes assessed in this study – democratic adherence and satisfaction with the regime. As the rotated component matrix with all analyzed variables

shows (see Annex - Table 7), the distinction between normative and realist dimensions of democracy is very clear for the citizens. Reaching 56% on an explaining model that has produced 11 components, only the 6th component reproduces completely Component 2 from the adherence matrix (see Table 3); Component 11 in its turn reproduces completely Component 6 from the performance matrix (see Table 6). These data certainly deserve a more detained analysis; nevertheless, they reveal the presence of distinct processes in the formation of citizens' stances regarding the democratic regime.

**Table 6. Regime performance -
Project Citizen distrust of democratic institutions**

rotated component matrix ^a

	components					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
satisfaction with democracy in the country						,629
considers Brazil a full democracy or a problematic one						,660
evaluation of the Lula government			,813			
evaluation of economic situation during the first Lula government			,811			
considers Brazilian election to be fair or fraudulent						,596
evaluation of the present economic situation			,660			
expectation for the economic situation next year			,601			
evaluation of the economic situation of one's own family					,792	
considers the household's earnings enough					,761	
evaluation of public services - housing		,634				
evaluation of public services - police		,570				
evaluation of public services - healthcare		,753				
evaluation of public services - education		,724				
evaluation of public services - transportation		,719				
evaluation of public services - unemployment insurance		,598				
evaluation of public services - sewage and sanitation		,653				
evaluation of public services - social security		,658				
performance evaluation - armed forces				,626		
performance evaluation - judicial system	,579					
performance evaluation - police	,593					
performance evaluation - national congress	,749					
performance evaluation - political parties	,708					
performance evaluation - trade unions	,601					
performance evaluation - businessmen	,687					
performance evaluation - government	,667					
performance evaluation - president			,640			
performance evaluation - firefighters				,608		

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

Obs.: Only loadings higher than 0,550 have been noted. Source: Citizen distrust of democratic institutions, 2006

Total Variance Explained

Component	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4,287	13,398	13,398
2	4,076	12,737	26,135
3	3,426	10,708	36,843
4	1,986	6,207	43,049
5	1,836	5,736	48,786
6	1,525	4,765	53,551

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Brief concluding remarks

While trying to understand the democratic paradox, Dahl (2000) asks himself whether citizens know what they prefer when they say they prefer democracy. Our data suggest that Brazilian`s perceptions about democracy are very clear. Our data on democratic adherence reassert and reinforce the strong association between direct elections and coping with economic problems, already emerged from definitions proposed by the general public since the beginning of the democratization process. More than a strong identification with the system and its constructs, democratic adherence emerges as something related to the universal value of free choice, resulting in some measure from the intense biennial electoral dynamics that characterizes the 21 years of democratic rule in the country. Institutional references related to the representative system do not emerge in direct association neither with regime preference nor with the evaluation of its performance.

Satisfaction with the regime emerges in association with the perception of the current government's efficiency. Less associated with the institutional dimension, citizens' perceptions of system performance favor the perception and evaluation of the chosen federal government, and the significant identification with the Lula government might explain a good share of the strength of the observed data. Evaluation of daily affairs and management, understood as the conjunction of institutional actions in the citizens' lives, seems to influence adherence to the democratic regime only indirectly.

The findings related to the importance of the economic dimension for the evaluation of performance and its impact over legitimacy must be underscored. We agree with the idea that the link between democracy support and satisfaction with the system is a

complex one, and it does not derive from the sheer impact of positive economic indicators (Montero, Gunther and Torcal, 1997). Nevertheless, data show that the economic dimension is crucial for taking positions related to politics and system management. The variable referring to evaluation of the economic situation is constantly present on the long-range map of references about the system. It seems possible to assume that, as a matter of fact, economic policies adopted during the democratic period and particularly the Real Plan (1994) has produced a strong “politicizing effect” on Brazilian citizens.

After 21 years of regular elections and a discourse that turned presidential elections into landmarks of democratic change, it seems coherent enough that these should be the basic features of adherence to democracy in Brazil.

These conclusions permit to present a reflexion about democratic theory that readjusts the centrality of representative institutions, in order to establish a new baseline, secondary (albeit necessary), for the significance of institutional references for democracy adherence. Yet in the same process the electoral praxis acquires a central role, allowing the vote and direct choice procedures to shape the civic engagement that sustains adherence to and satisfaction with the democratic regime. It seems appropriate to suggest that these behavior vectors are reinforced by the presidentialist design of representation in Brazil. It still remains as an open question whether the kind of government system actually sets the conditions for the production of support to democracy and democratic sustenance. Our opinion is that it is in fact irrelevant for that matter.

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Annex 1- Table 7. Democratic adherence and satisfaction
 (% variance explained = 56%)

Rotated Component Matrix

	Component											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
evaluation of the Lula government		,806										
evaluation of the economic situation during the Lula government compared with the previous period		,812										
avaliação sit.econômica gov.FHC com relação ao período anterior					,756							
evaluation of the current economic situation compared with the military regime					,528							
evaluation of the human rights record of the FHC government compared with the previous period					,784							
evaluation of the human rights record of the Lula government compared with the previous period		,697										
evaluation of the current human rights record compared with the military regime					,539							
evaluation of the corruption levels during the FHC government compared with the previous period								,595				
evaluation of the corruption levels during the Lula government compared with the previous period		,522						,645				
evaluation of the current corruption levels record compared with the military regime								,763				
democracy as the best form of government						,655						
preference for the democratic regime						,609						
political parties necessary for democracy				,780								
Congress necessary for democracy				,783								
president identified with political parties				,508								
importance of voting						,619						
Congress necessary for Brazil				,694								
mandatory vote						,529						
satisfaction with democracy in Brazil												,552
evaluation of democracy in Brazil (full, problematic, very problematic)												,613
Brazilian elections are fair or fraudulent												,528
evaluation of the economic situation in the country		,663										
evaluation of personal and familial economic situation							,797					
evaluation of personal economic situation compared with 10 years ago, compared with the rest of Brazilians							,530					
evaluation of personal and familial income level							,721					
public services evaluation - housing			,604									
public services evaluation - police			,551									
public services evaluation - healthcare			,737									
public services evaluation - education			,725									
public services evaluation - transport			,734									
public services evaluation - unemployment insurance			,571									
public services evaluation - sewage and sanitation			,675									
public services evaluation - social security			,669									
institutions' evaluation - Church									,643			
institutions' evaluation - armed forces									,503			
institutions' evaluation - judicial system	,575											
institutions' evaluation - police	,582											
institutions' evaluation - National Congress	,746											
institutions' evaluation - political parties	,712											
institutions' evaluation - television	,181											
institutions' evaluation - trade unions	,637											
institutions' evaluation - businessmen	,719											
institutions' evaluation - government	,666											
institutions' evaluation - president		,652										
institutions' evaluation - firefighters												,546
institutions' evaluation - laws of the country	,565											

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 25 iterations.

Annex 2- Methodological information

Project: Citizen distrust of democratic institutions

Nationwide survey of Brazilian adult citizens, with the eligibility requirement of age 16 years old;

National representative sample of 2.004 face-to-face interviews;

Sample Selection Procedures:

- In the first stage - 146 primary sampling units (PSU) or municipalities were selected by region based on the Index of Human Development - IDH groups; probability proportional to size (PPS); 30 of these municipalities were selected with certainty as self-representing PSUs, 19 as state capitals and 11 as metropolitan areas. 116 were randomly selected.

- In the second stage - secondary units (census tracts) were selected PPS within each of the PSUs;

- In the third stage - households were selected within census tracts based on quotas by sex, age, education and working/not working population, as defined in the 2004 National Household Sample Research.

The survey has been undertaken during the first and second weeks of June, 2006

Project ESEB - Brazilian post-Electoral Study -2006

National representative sample

First stage> 70 primary sample units (municípios) selected PPS - probability proportional to size.

24 of these municípios (PSU) are selected as self - representing PSUs (state capitals)

second stage> selection of census tracts > selected PPS within each of the PSUs

third stage> within each census tract - quota sampling, by age, education, sex and working/not working population, as defined by the 2003 National Household Sample Research/ IBGE (the official institute that makes the Census)

1.000 interviews

error margin= 3,2%