The In Focus project is releasing the following report on U.S.-Mexico
policy in light of Clinton's upcoming trip to Mexico on Monday. We hope
that it will be a useful tool in shaping the current policy debate. If you
have comments, questions or would like copies in print please respond to me
directly.
Sincerely,
Erik Leaver
Communications Director
---------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign Policy In Focus: Reconfiguring Mexico Policy
February 1998
Vol. 4, No. 7
Written by Eric L. Olson, Washington Office on Latin America
Edited by Tom Barry (IRC) and Martha Honey (IPS)
Key Points
o Mexico's stability, prosperity, and peace are vitally important to U.S.
national security.
o Despite sparking record trade volume and foreign investment, NAFTA has
increased Mexico's vulnerability to international financial turmoil and
contributed to a rise in poverty.
o U.S. counternarcotics policy has not only failed to reduce the flow of
drugs but has also strained relations between the two countries while
exacerbating corruption and human rights violations within Mexico.
It has become something of a cliché to say that Mexico is of vital national
importance to the United States. Considering Mexico's 2000-mile common
border, its population of 99 million people, and its status as America's
second largest trading partner, it is little wonder that the promotion of
peace and prosperity is the stated cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Mexico.
Yet despite the obvious importance of Mexico, current U.S. policy is
fragmented, often contradictory, and lacks a clear strategy or focus. U.S.
policy is dominated by a counternarcotics strategy that has resulted in
greater instability in bilateral relations while failing to curb the flow
of illegal drugs. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
centerpiece of U.S. economic relations with Mexico, has failed to produce
the broad-based economic prosperity in Mexico that proponents had
predicted. Ironically, issues that would contribute to greater peace and
prosperity-such as human rights, democracy, and poverty reduction-are
completely off the official agenda.
The war on drugs has become the top priority-and the greatest source of
friction-in U.S. relations with Mexico. The Clinton administration argues
that Mexican drug production and trafficking not only pose a threat to the
health and well-being of America, but also threaten to undermine Mexican
stability. Because as much as two-thirds of all cocaine enters the U.S.
through Mexico, and Mexico is the source of 20-30% of the heroin and 80% of
all methamphetamine that enters the U.S., Washington has pursued an
aggressive strategy. Largely bypassing what were believed to be hopelessly
corrupt Mexican police and judicial institutions, the Clinton
administration turned instead to developing partnerships with the Mexican
military. Among other things, the U.S. has sent 73 helicopters and other
excess military equipment to aid the Mexican military in counternarcotics
operations. In fiscal year 1997 the State and Defense departments spent
approximately $83 million on counternarcotics efforts in Mexico. Their 1998
budget, which did not include helicopter transfers and featured less
training, declined to roughly $28 million. In 1998 approximately $13
million was spent to train just over 1,000 Mexican soldiers in
counternarcotics techniques-more than any other Latin American military.
Despite these expenditures, the flow of illegal drugs from Mexico has not
been reduced significantly.
A key component of U.S. drug policy is the annual certification process,
whereby Clinton must certify before Congress the extent to which other
countries are "fully cooperating" with U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Even
though Mexico is consistently certified, the process has led to rancorous
debate both within the administration and with Congress in the last two
years. Spectacular cases of corruption among Mexican military and civilian
authorities have fanned the flames of congressional drug warriors bent on
decertifying Mexico.
Meanwhile, the certification process, intended to leverage greater
cooperation from other countries, has become a major irritant in
U.S.-Mexican relations. Mexico sees the process as unilateral,
hypocritical, and particularly offensive because the U.S. is the world's
biggest consumer of illegal drugs and the driving force behind the drug
cartels.
Unlike drug policy, bilateral economic relations have ceased to be an issue
of much public debate within U.S. policy circles. Yet the absence of public
debate should not cloud the fact that bilateral economic relations-and
greater economic integration, in particular-continue to be the centerpiece
of U.S. efforts to promote prosperity in Mexico.
NAFTA, now entering its sixth year, is Washington's primary vehicle for
Mexican economic integration. The agreement joined Mexico, the U.S., and
Canada in the world's largest free trade area and was supposed to usher
Mexico into the developed world. But the high expectations it generated
have failed to materialize. Despite sparking record trade levels and
foreign investment, economic integration has also linked Mexico to an
increasingly volatile global economy. For example, the Asian and Russian
financial crises have rebounded negatively toward Mexico, eroding investor
confidence in most developing countries.
In 1995, and again in 1998, Mexico's economy was ravaged by capital flight
and declining investor confidence. Some argue that NAFTA cushioned Mexico's
economic slump by facilitating trade and investment. Yet the same NAFTA
rules that facilitated the flow of foreign capital into Mexico also
guaranteed its rapid repatriation during times of crisis, leaving Mexico's
domestic economy in a shambles.
Problems With Current U.S. Policy
Key Problems
o U.S. policy undermines peace and prosperity in Mexico by pursuing failed
counternarcotics and economic integration strategies.
o U.S. policy ignores Mexico's dismal human rights situation, and it fails
to recognize that the injustices at the root of southern Mexico's armed
conflicts are felt throughout that nation.
o U.S. policy has never seriously encouraged Mexico's struggle for
democracy but has instead weakened its fragile democratic transition.
Current U.S. policy toward Mexico is fundamentally flawed for three
reasons. It undermines peace and prosperity in Mexico by pursuing failed
counternarcotics and economic integration strategies. It has largely
ignored Mexico's serious human rights situation and blinked at armed
conflicts that have a direct impact on peace and stability. It has never
seriously encouraged the struggle for democracy under way in Mexico and, at
times, has even weakened it.
Although the proponents of economic integration have declared NAFTA an
unqualified success due to increasing bilateral trade, an analysis of
salaries and poverty statistics suggests another view. By the end of 1997,
average salaries for all Mexican workers had fallen to 60% of their 1994
value. In addition, according to a study by Mexico's National Institute of
Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI), extreme poverty rose by 53%
from 1994 while income became increasingly concentrated.
Mexico's economic woes are not solely the result of NAFTA. Record low
prices for oil, a key Mexican export, and structural adjustment policies
adopted as part of the U.S.-conceived peso bailout package in 1995 have
also played a role. U.S. requirements that Mexico follow a liberalized
monetary policy as a condition for aid resulted in skyrocketing interest
rates. High interest rates, in turn, plunged the Mexican economy into deep
recession and crippled the banking system.
U.S. counternarcotics policies have had a destabilizing impact on bilateral
relations, because they are perceived by Mexico as unilateral and
hypocritical, undermining what little binational cooperation exists. Mexico
has consistently protested a policy that judges them for their
counternarcotics efforts but does not judge the efforts of the largest
consumer of illegal drugs-namely, the United States. Additionally, U.S.
promotion of an expanded role for the Mexican military in antidrug and
public security operations has further weakened civilian law enforcement
institutions, has contributed to the military's greater exposure to
corruption, and has sparked a dramatic increase in human rights violations
committed by the military. Furthermore, the lines between counternarcotics
and counterinsurgency operations have become increasingly blurred in
several parts of Mexico, because counternarcotics operations often occur in
the same place where military forces are confronting armed insurgents.
The dangers of U.S. counternarcotics strategies are exacerbated by
Washington's failure to consider Mexico's dismal human rights record.
According to a report issued by the Inter-American Commission for Human
Rights in October 1998, counternarcotics efforts in Mexico are often the
context for human rights violations. The commission has received numerous
complaints of "enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, which
have taken place in the context of the fight against guerilla groups, drug
trafficking, and common crime." A Human Rights Watch report released in
January 1999 found that prosecutors routinely use information gathered by
the police and military through illegal means, such as torture, and that
judges turn a blind eye to the practice. Recent statements by U.S. State
Department spokesman James Rubin concerning persistent human rights
violations in Mexico are encouraging and indicate just how urgently human
rights need to be integrated into U.S. relations with Mexico.
Particularly troubling is the failure of U.S. policy to grasp the
significance of the armed uprisings in Mexico's most impoverished southern
states of Chiapas and Guerrero. Washington has shown little interest in
these revolts, accepting the Mexican government's explanation that they are
internal matters reflecting local conflicts and containing no national
implications. Rather than isolated conflicts, these uprisings reflect the
growing desperation of a poor rural population that has failed to reap the
benefits promised by economic modernization and integration. These folks
are tired of the human rights violations and undemocratic practices that
they have endured for decades.
The U.S. has shied away from Mexican democracy issues, even though it has
long maintained that promotion of democratic societies is the key to global
stability. Ironically, though Washington's stake in stability is highest in
Mexico, promotion of democracy is seen as nearly impossible there due to
Mexican sensitivities to foreign intervention. Furthermore, with
counternarcotics efforts and economic integration considered to be more
pressing priorities, democracy has slipped off the U.S. agenda. The U.S.
has largely accepted as fact that Mexico is irreversibly on a path toward
full democratization. Thus Washington has not invested much in promoting
electoral or institutional democratization in Mexico.
U.S. policy has been quick to overlook the challenges that remain in
Mexico's democratic transition and is overly optimistic about the outcome
of Mexico's struggle for democracy. By not paying sufficient attention to
the problems, Washington has made two mistakes. First, it tends to view
political instability, such as the conflicts in Chiapas and Guerrero, as
local matters reflecting local disputes rather than as symptoms of a wider
failure of democracy throughout Mexico. These conflicts are not just about
poverty or local land disputes, as some have argued, but are also about the
right to self-determination, electoral freedom, and gaining a voice in
basic decisions about governance. Second, U.S. policy has contributed to
undermining Mexico's democratic transition by supporting a greater role for
the Mexican military in civilian affairs and by failing to support the
creation of strong civilian institutions that are transparent and publicly
accountable.
Toward a New Foreign Policy
Key Recommendations
o Symmetry, cooperation, and mutual respect should be the foundations of
U.S.-Mexico policy.
o The U.S. should help reduce poverty and inequality in Mexico by adjusting
aspects of NAFTA that have hurt Mexico's poor and by supporting programs
within international financial institutions that target poverty.
o The U.S. must end its militarized approach to counternarcotics, including
training Mexican soldiers in antidrug tactics. These tactics can be used
for counterinsurgency and can lead to increased corruption and human rights
violations.
America's challenge is to define a new foreign policy that ensures peace
and prosperity in Mexico by promoting progressive values-such as greater
economic equity, participatory democracy, and respect for human
rights-without falling into the traditional paternalism of U.S. foreign
policy. There are four basic components to such a policy.
First, U.S.-Mexican relations should be based squarely on symmetry,
cooperation, and mutual respect. For example, the current drug
certification process urgently needs to be replaced with a new multilateral
approach in which countries cooperate to fashion mutually acceptable goals
and strategies in combating illegal drugs. Support for the Multilateral
Counterdrug Alliance, established during the presidential summit in
Santiago, Chile, in April 1998, should be the cornerstone of this new
approach.
Likewise, human rights and democracy issues should become an integral part
of the official bilateral agenda and should be discussed at regular
binational forums that deal with economic issues, immigration policy,
counternarcotics efforts, and other important bilateral concerns. Promotion
of human rights should not be limited to one country condemning another.
Mexico has legitimate human rights concerns in the U.S., including the
treatment of immigrants and migrant workers and the handling of capital
punishment cases. Although both formal and informal discussions on human
rights issues already occur, they tend to be among lower level officials
and are separated from the broader bilateral agenda. By including human
rights in the regular bilateral agenda, the issue will gain importance and
will become an integral part of all policy discussions rather than
something dealt with separately, unrelated to other issues.
Second, the U.S. must make reducing poverty and combating inequality the
cornerstone of its relations with Mexico and the rest of Latin America.
Although trade can play an important part in Mexico's development, the
current free trade model has merely exacerbated the inequalities in Mexican
society. Both countries should undertake an objective review of NAFTA and
make adjustments to those aspects of the agreement that have had the
greatest impact on poor people, especially in the rural sector. For
example, it may be necessary to provide extended tariff protection to
producers of basic grains, most of whom are peasants and indigenous farmers.
The U.S. should also exercise leadership in the international financial
institutions (IFIs) by prioritizing programs that directly address poverty.
Targeted lending by the IFIs to small rural producers and enterprises,
indigenous communities, small businesses, and women and children should be
a greater priority than protecting foreign investors who gamble on
international markets. And Washington needs to demonstrate more flexibility
in its bilateral economic relations with Mexico, placing fewer conditions
on future loans and assistance and allowing for some restrictions on the
flow of capital.
Third, U.S. counternarcotics policy must be fundamentally changed. In the
last few years, the U.S. has trained large numbers of Mexican military
personnel in counternarcotics courses. There has been an expanded role for
the Mexican military in antinarcotics activities far exceeding any external
defense concerns, which is problematic if only for that reason.
Furthermore, U.S. counternarcotics courses are said to be very similar in
content to counterinsurgency courses, and as the U.S. currently does not
track where the trained Mexican soldiers are subsequently stationed, it is
impossible to know if the skills they learned are used in counternarcotics
efforts or in counterinsurgency operations in Chiapas. Instead of a
militarized approach to combating drug trafficking, the U.S. must begin
from the premise that lower demand at home is the most effective way to
combat illegal drugs.
Finally, Washington should make strengthening the rule of law the
centerpiece of its efforts to promote greater democracy and human rights in
Mexico. Without strong, transparent, and accountable judicial institutions,
human rights violations will continue to increase, as will corruption. The
U.S. need not dictate reforms, but can just shift its support away from
militarized solutions to the difficult but necessary task of building
democratic institutions.
U.S. relations with Mexico are in urgent need of change. The risks of
staying on the current course are too high for both the U.S. and Mexico. It
is time to hold the administration accountable to its commitment to promote
peace and prosperity in Mexico and force it to adopt new strategies for
meeting these tremendous challenges.
Eric Olson, Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America,
specializes in Mexico and hemispheric economic issues.
Statistical Background
Mexico's Major Trading Partners (1998 est)
Exports
U.S. 85%
Canada 2.1%
Japan 1%
Imports
U.S. 74.8%
Japan 4.1%
Germany 3.5%
Canada 1.8%
Total U.S.-Mexico Trade
1993 1998 (est)
$81 billion $174 billion
U.S.-Mexico Trade Balance
1993 1998 (est)
$16.6 billion -$15.7 billion
U.S. Direct Investment in Mexico
1994 1998 (est)
$16.9 billion $25.3 billion
Mexico's External Debt
1997
$162 billion
U.S. Counternarcotics Security Assistance
1997 1998 (est)
$83 million $28 million
Other U.S. Security/Assistance Sales
Foreign Military and Construction Sales (loans)
1997 1998 (est)
$37.1 million $15 million
Licensed Direct Commercial Sales
1996 1997
$146.7 million $30.9 million
U.S. Economic Aid
1997 1998 (est)
$16.3 million $11.3 million
(Includes development assistance, child survival, and Economic Support
Funds, and $1 million in USAID support in 1998 for International Narcotics
Control Fund)
Sources for More Information
Organizations
Development Group for Alternative Policies
927 15th St. NW, Fourth Floor
Washington, DC 20005
Voice: (202) 898-1566
Fax: (202) 898-1612
Email: DGAP@igc.org
Website: http://www.igc.org/dgap
Contact: Karen Hansen-Kuhn
Drug Strategies
1575 Eye St. NW, Ste. 210
Washington, DC 20005
Voice: (202) 289-9070
Fax: (202) 414-6199
Email: dspolicy@aol.com
Website: http://www.drugstrategies.org
Economic Policy Institute
1660 L St. NW, Ste. 1200
Washington, DC 20036
Voice: (202) 775-8810
Fax: (202) 775-0819
Email: epi@epinet.org
Website: http://epinet.org
Global Exchange
2017 Mission St., #303
San Francisco, CA 94110
Voice: (415) 255-7296
Fax: (415) 255-7498
Email: info@globalexchange.org
Website: http://www.globalexchange.org
Contact: Ted Lewis
Human Rights Watch
1522 K St. NW, Ste. 910
Washington, DC 20005
Voice: (202) 371-6592
Fax: (202) 371-0124
Email: hrwdc@hrw.org
Website: http://www.hrw.org
Latin America Data Base
University of New Mexico
801 Yale NE
Albuquerque, NM 87131-1016
Voice: (800) 472-0888, (505) 277-6839
Fax: (505) 277-6837
Email: info@ladb.unm.edu
Website: http://ladb.unm.edu
Washington Office on Latin America
1630 Connecticut Ave. NW, 2nd Floor
Washington, DC 20009
Voice: (202) 797-2171
Fax: (202) 797-2172
Email: wola@wola.org
Website: http://www.wola.org
Publications
Alliance for Responsible Trade, Alternatives for the Americas: Building a
Peoples' Hemispheric Agreement (Washington, DC: Alliance for Responsible
Trade, 1998).
Human Rights Watch, Systemic Injustice: Torture, "Disappearance," and
Extrajudicial Execution in Mexico (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999).
Olson, Eric L., So Close and Yet So Far: Mexico's Mid-term Elections and
the Struggle for Democracy (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin
America, 1997).
World Wide Web
Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos
http://www.laneta.apc.orgcmdpdh
Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights Center
http://www.laneta.apc.org/cdhbcasas
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Mexico, 1998
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Mexico98en/table-of-contents.htm
Just the Facts: A Civilian's Guide To U.S. Defense And Security Assistance
to Latin America and the Caribbean
http://www.ciponline.org/facts/
Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center
http://mixcoac.uia.mx/~prodh/default.htm
Office of National Drug Control Policy
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov
U.S. Department of State, Mexico Country Report on Human Rights Practices
for 1997
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/mexico.html
U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce
http://www.usmcoc.org/
*****************************************************************
Foreign Policy In Focus is a joint project of the Interhemipsheric Resource
Center (IRC) and the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS). In Focus briefs
document the problems of current U.S. foreign policy and offer
recommendations for alternative policy directions that would make the United
States a more responsible global partner.
To order Foreign Policy In Focus, call (505) 842-8288 or visit
our website for ordering information at: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org.
To subscribe to the New U.S. Foreign Policy discussion list, send
a message to: newusfp-manager@zianet.com. Inside the body of the
message write: Join newusfp [Your Email Address].
*****************************************************************
----------------------
Erik Leaver
Communications Director
Interhemispheric Resource Center
Box 4506
Albuquerque, NM 87196
Voice: 505-842-8288
Fax: 505-246-1601
Email: leaver@swcp.com
Web: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org
http://www.zianet.com/irc1